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Why Investing in 
Kids Makes Sense for 
Local Economies
My recent book, Investing in Kids: 
Early Childhood Programs and Local 
Economic Development (Bartik [2011], 
published by the Upjohn Institute), 
makes the case for why an investment 
in high-quality early childhood 
programs will pay off in improved local 
economic development. State and local 
governments must take the lead for this 
expanded public investment; the federal 
government has other pressing concerns.
Why is there a local payoff from 
early childhood programs? Many child 
participants in these programs will 
remain in their home states or metro 
areas for most of their working careers. 
High-quality early childhood programs 
will enhance the skills of these former 
child participants. As a result, the local 
economy will have more skilled labor, 
which will attract more and better jobs 
to the local economy. An increase in 
the number and quality of jobs will 
raise local per capita earnings, the most 
important benefi t of local economic 
development. Although many policies 
affect job skills, early childhood 
programs deserve emphasis because of 
good evidence for cost-effectiveness. 
Investing in skills through early 
childhood programs is an alternative to 
traditional local economic development 
policies. These traditional policies have 
emphasized business tax incentives such 
as property tax abatements. If successful, 
such incentives boost labor demand. 
The most important benefi t of increased 
labor demand is higher per capita local 
earnings. 
In contrast, early childhood programs 
mainly work on the labor supply side 
of the local economy. These programs 
can increase local labor supply quality 
because Americans are less mobile than 
sometimes thought. About two-thirds of 
Americans spend most of their working 
careers in their childhood states (see 
Figure 1). Over half spend most of their 
working careers in their home metro 
areas. These percentages do not decline 
much for smaller or slower-growing 
metro areas (Bartik 2009).
In an era of declining relative 
communication and transportation costs, 
businesses are increasingly free to locate 
far from raw materials or markets. But 
businesses need to be close to a supply 
of skilled labor. “Business climate” is as 
much affected by local labor force quality 
as by business taxes.
High-quality early 
childhood programs will 
result in a local economy with 
more skilled labor, which 
will attract more and better 
jobs to the local economy.
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But why emphasize early childhood 
programs when local labor supply quality 
can be affected by K-12 education, job 
training, or by attracting the “creative 
class” (Florida 2002)? Early childhood 
programs should be emphasized 
because they have rigorous evidence 
of effectiveness. A random assignment 
experiment, the Perry Preschool Program, 
shows that preschool can have large 
effects on educational attainment and 
adult earnings through age 40. A large-
scale preschool program, the Chicago 
Child-Parent Center program, also 
provides good evidence on preschool’s 
long-term effectiveness in increasing 
high school graduation rates. Shorter-
term studies in at least seven states use 
a rigorous “regression-discontinuity” 
evaluation design to show that large-scale 
state-funded pre-K programs can improve 
kindergarten readiness. 
Other early childhood programs also 
have rigorous positive evaluations. The 
Nurse-Family Partnership is a nurse 
home visitation program that provides 
services to fi rst-time disadvantaged 
mothers from the prenatal period to age 
two, and seeks to improve prenatal care, 
parenting, and the mom’s life course. 
Experimental evidence shows that the 
program reduces juvenile crime. The 
Abecedarian program, a full-time child 
care and preschool program from birth 
to age fi ve, has evidence from a random 
assignment experiment that it increases 
employment of mothers and educational 
attainment of former child participants. 
We know more about the long-term 
effects of early childhood programs than 
about the long-term effects of 3rd grade. 
It is impossible to randomly deny 3rd 
grade to a child, whereas many random 
assignment and other rigorous studies 
have been done for early childhood 
programs. 
A reasonable question is how 
it is possible for such limited-time 
interventions in early childhood to 
have large effects on adult outcomes. 
As suggested by Nobel Prize–winning 
economist James Heckman and others, 
the answer seems to be effects of early 
childhood programs on “soft skills” 
(Heckman et al. 2010). Sometimes the 
effects of early childhood programs on 
“hard skills,” such as those measured 
by reading and math tests, seem to fade 
as students progress through the K-12 
system. However, soft skill effects 
of early childhood programs seem to 
become more profound over time. Soft 
skills include how the child interacts with 
peers and teachers, the child’s ability to 
plan, and the child’s self-confi dence. A 
more confi dent child with better peer and 
teacher relationships will fi nd such skills 
rewarded during kindergarten, which 
encourages further development of these 
skills, and so on as the child continues 
through school.
For early childhood programs to be 
effective, these programs must be high 
quality. But we know something about 
how to create quality programs. For 
preschool, class sizes must be reasonable, 
the curriculum must engage the child in 
active learning, and teachers must know 
how to encourage learning without being 
overly directive. For the Nurse-Family 
Partnership program, we know that it 
works better with nurse home visitors 
than with paraprofessionals. 
Based on studies of early childhood 
programs, as well as estimates of how 
many former child participants will 
remain in the state, and based on the 
effects of state labor quality on job 
growth, I provide estimates in my 
book for the ratio of state economic 
development benefi ts to costs for three 
early childhood programs. These state 
economic development benefi ts are 
the increased present value of state 
residents’ per capita earnings. The three 
early childhood programs are universal 
pre-K for four-year-olds, the Nurse-
Family Partnership program, and the 
Abecedarian program. Figure 2 shows 
these estimates.
For comparison, the fi gure also shows 
the ratio of economic development 
benefi ts to costs for well-designed 
business tax incentives. Ratios are 
similar across all four programs: all these 
programs increase state residents’ per 
capita earnings by two to three times their 
costs. 
From a national perspective, early 
childhood programs have larger 
economic development benefi ts. These 
Figure 1  Percentage of U.S. Adults Living in Same State as at Birth or in
                Early Childhood
NOTE: Data on percentages living in birth state are calculated by the author from the Public Use 
Microdata Samples, 2000 census. Note that these fi gures are biased downward, probably about 6 
percent, because of households listing location of hospital as state of birth, not residential location 
of mother at time of birth. Data on percentages living in same state as at age 4 are calculated by the 
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Early childhood programs 
should be emphasized 
because they have rigorous 
evidence of effectiveness.
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national benefi ts include the increased 
earnings of former child participants who 
move to other states. In contrast, business 
tax incentives have smaller benefi ts from 
a national perspective. Most of the state 
benefi ts of business tax incentives are 
due to state business activity that would 
have otherwise occurred elsewhere in the 
United States. 
Furthermore, federal policy should 
discourage states’ indiscriminate use 
of business tax incentives. It should 
encourage states’ investments in high-
quality early childhood programs.
However, the federal government 
currently has a lot on its plate, with 
budget defi cit problems and challenges 
from rising health care costs. Major 
federal interventions with business tax 
incentives or early childhood programs 
seem politically unlikely. States are on 
their own.
One political impediment to state 
investment in early childhood programs 
is the long-term nature of these economic 
development benefi ts. Most of the 
increased earnings per capita due to 
early childhood programs only occur 20 
or so years later, when the former child 
participants enter the labor force.
However, some of these programs’ 
benefi ts for children may be increasingly 
valued by parents. This parental valuation 
may make it easier for businesses to 
attract parents to a state offering high-
quality early childhood programs, and it 
may also increase property values. For 
example, we know that home values are 
increased by higher elementary school 
test scores. In the book, I calculate that 
universal pre-K, due to its effects in 
increasing elementary school test scores, 
should raise local property values by 
about 13 times the annual program costs 
of providing universal pre-K. 
There are historical precedents for 
state initiatives to invest in expanded 
education. The common school 
movement of the nineteenth century, 
along with the high school movement of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, were grassroots initiatives at 
the state and local levels. These state and 
local investments in expanded education 
were in part motivated by the potential 
short- and long-run economic benefi ts 
for local communities. For example, in 
1914, the Iowa Department of Public 
Instruction made the following argument: 
“The landlord who lives in town . . . may 
well be reminded that when he offers his 
farm for sale it will be to his advantage to 
advertise, ‘free transportation to a good 
graded school’” (quoted in Goldin and 
Katz [2008], p. 193).
The idea of early childhood programs 
as a spur to state and local economic 
development is a powerful concept. The 
Figure 2  Ratio of Economic Development Benefi ts to Cost, State versus
                National Perspective
empirical evidence supports this idea, but 
will it become accepted by the public, 
the business community, and political 
leaders? If so, this new way of thinking 
about economic development may 
encourage the political support needed 
to make early childhood programs more 
broadly available. 
Note
This article contains many statements that 
are not referenced due to space constraints. 
For a complete bibliography, please see the 
book, Investing in Kids.
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Carolyn J. Heinrich
The Performance of 
Performance Standards
Incentives and accountability for 
government performance have become 
so central to contemporary government 
reform agendas across the globe that 
public management scholars have 
proclaimed a new era of “government by 
performance management” (Moynihan 
and Pandey 2005, p. 422). Elements of 
these recent reforms include establishing 
performance measures and standards 
to facilitate increased accountability 
to the public, pay for performance, 
organization-wide performance bonuses, 
and competitive performance-based 
contracting; reducing “red tape” and 
promoting more transparent management; 
and devolving government functions 
and incentivizing innovation. A core 
objective of incorporating performance 
measures and standards into public 
sector incentive systems is to create clear 
expectations for government performance 
(while loosening the reins of bureaucratic 
control) and allow for overt assessment 
of results. If they are to be more than 
data collection exercises, however, 
performance management systems 
also need to incorporate a means for 
incentivizing or rewarding individuals, 
teams, or entire organizations for their 
achievements relative to performance 
goals. 
In the United States, performance 
standards systems and bonuses are (or 
have been) used in Food Stamps and 
welfare-to-work programs, employment 
and training programs, child welfare 
agencies and child support enforcement 
programs, Medicaid and SCHIP 
programs, and other social programs. 
Performance incentive systems in public 
bureaucracies are also advancing in 
Europe and other parts of the world, with 
some governments such as Australia 
and the Netherlands now implementing 
incentive systems with fully (100 
percent) performance-contingent pay and 
contracting arrangements (Finn 2008; 
Struyven and Steurs 2005) As the use 
of performance measures and incentive 
systems has expanded in the public 
sector, so has the number of studies 
calling attention to their challenges 
and unintended effects, although there 
is relatively little rigorous empirical 
evidence of their implications for 
government outcomes. 
Among the earliest introductions 
of incentive systems in government 
agencies was the Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA) performance standards 
system in 1982, described by Klerman 
(2005, p. 347) as one of the “most mature 
implementations of performance-based 
management.” It is also one of the most 
studied systems, in part because of the 
randomized experimental evaluation 
of the JTPA program that produced 
important information for assessing 
the performance of this performance 
standards system. Policymakers have 
looked to the results of these studies to 
inform and guide changes in the design 
and operation of performance standards 
systems in other government programs, 
as well as to improve these systems in 
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) 
programs that replaced JTPA. 
At the same time, one of the 
motivations for assembling the research 
presented in our new book, The 
Performance of Performance Standards 
(published by the Upjohn Institute), 
is that despite decades of study and 
practice, some of the important lessons 
that have been learned do not appear to 
be refl ected in the current design and 
implementation of performance standards 
systems. Bevan and Hood (2006, p. 7), 
for example, describe the development 
and use of performance targets in the 
English public health care system, 
along with the perverse incentives they 
generated, as “hitting the target and 
missing the point.” 
It may be that some of the empirical 
evidence from past studies has not 
been effectively communicated or 
penetrated policymaking and public 
management circles deeply enough. Or 
it may be that some of the fundamental 
lessons have been ignored or deferred 
in pursuit of other objectives (political 
or otherwise). Or, as James Heckman 
and Jeffrey Smith comment, it may be 
that policymakers who have mandated 
such systems (and administrators 
involved in their implementation) have 
not fully appreciated the challenges of 
designing a performance management 
system that generates incentives for 
improving performance and impacts. 
For example, even if a government 
designed a performance management 
system that initially suggested a strong 
correlation between performance 
measures and desired outcomes, over 
time, its effectiveness may decline as 
program managers learn how to game 
the measures and other limitations of 
the measures and system design become 
known. 
The essays we present use U.S. 
employment and training programs as a 
“laboratory” for investigation. Drawing 
on a variety of data sources on these 
incentives systems, we explore how 
performance standards and incentives 
affect the behavior of public managers 
and agency employees, their approaches 
to service delivery, and ultimately, the 
outcomes for participants. Both the 
JTPA and WIA programs have allowed 
state and local administrators and their 
governing boards substantial discretion, 
within broad limits, to determine 
performance goals, standards, and bonus 
systems. This administrative fl exibility 
is refl ected in the range of incentive 
systems that states have implemented 
over time. It is this variation in incentive 
systems among states that serves as the 
grist for our empirical mill and is used to 
extract general lessons that can be applied 
on a wider scale to both existing and 
newly developing performance incentive 
systems.
In our investigation of formal 
incentive structures and organizational 
behavior within U.S. employment 
and training programs, we focus 
on the following questions that are 
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broadly applicable to any public sector 
performance management and incentive 
system: 
• How do performance standards 
and measures operate to include or 
exclude individuals with different 
characteristics in public programs? 
• How do performance standards and 
measures affect the types of public 
services offered and received? 
• How do the processes for setting 
standards and weights for 
performance goals and for recognizing 
and rewarding performance affect 
system incentives and bureaucratic 
responses?
• Are the performance standards, 
measures, and incentives effective 
in motivating bureaucratic behavior 
toward the achievement of program 
goals? 
• Do short-term outcome measures used 
in performance standards systems 
predict long-term impacts of programs 
on participants?
• What problems or unintended effects 
are associated with the design and 
implementation of performance 
standards systems in the public sector? 
• What other lessons do we learn from 
the implementation of performance 
standards systems and the variation in 
rules and guidelines governing their 
administration over time? 
In undertaking research to address 
the questions above, we were fortunate 
to have access to data superior in scope 
and detail to much of the data used in 
the existing literature or available on 
a regular basis for assessing program 
performance. Our research benefi tted 
from detailed longitudinal, microlevel 
data that were collected in the National 
JTPA Study (NJS) and through other 
administrative data sources. In addition, 
we collected and analyzed complete 
information about state-level variation in 
the JTPA and WIA performance standards 
systems. We show that state incentive 
systems are highly complex and differ 
widely across states and over time within 
states, and are not easily characterized 
by small dimensional summary measures 
as used in previous studies. This wealth 
of data, to which we applied a variety of 
analytical/empirical strategies, is essential 
in assessing the implications of features 
and changes in performance standards 
and incentive systems in different 
contexts and across time. 
The broad fi ndings and lessons that we 
draw from this research are as follows. 
First, individuals and organizations 
respond to incentives, but sometimes 
the responses are perverse. In the fi rst 
iteration of a performance standards 
system’s design, well-meaning designers 
of the system are unlikely to fully 
anticipate the responses of program 
administrators and frontline workers to 
system incentives, or the many possible 
ways they might infl uence measured 
performance without necessarily adding 
to (or possibly even detracting from) 
program value or impact. Incentive 
system designers will have to expect 
to regularly review and revise the rules 
and incentives they create if they want 
to avoid ineffi cient and unintended 
responses. 
Second, the short-term outcome 
measures that are commonly used in 
performance standards systems are 
only weakly related to the true long-run 
impacts of the programs. Researchers 
and policymakers have yet to identify 
performance measures that will promote 
key, long-term program objectives while 
simultaneously generating more readily 
available performance information for 
ongoing program management. This will 
continue to be one of the most vexing 
challenges for performance standards 
system designers for some time to come.
Third, the “cream-skimming” issue, 
or concern about the trade-off between 
effi ciency and equity in access to 
programs, has been overstated. While 
there is some evidence of a trade-off 
between serving the most disadvantaged 
and allocating program resources most 
effi ciently, it appears to be modest at 
best. Personal choices and informational 
constraints play a more important 
role in accounting for demographic 
differences in program participation 
than administrative discretion, and thus, 
program administrators should consider 
investing more in increasing awareness 
among the eligible population.
Clearly, demand on the part of 
policymakers or the public for greater 
accountability and a results-oriented 
government is not diminishing. 
The design and implementation of 
performance standards and incentive 
systems in the public sector will continue 
to be a dynamic pursuit, and it is our hope 
that the lessons distilled in this volume 
will have a role in shaping and speeding 
their evolution, as well as in ultimately 
improving government performance.
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Randall W. Eberts
When Will the Labor 
Market Recover?
Although it has been nearly two years 
since the Great Recession of 2007 was 
offi cially declared over, we are still waiting 
for jobs to recover. More than 9.0 million 
people joined the ranks of the unemployed 
during the 18-month recession—the worst 
since the Great Depression, bringing the 
total number of unemployed to nearly 16 
million. While real GDP is currently within 
one percent of its prerecession peak, total 
private employment is still nearly 6 percent 
below the employment peak of December 
2007. 
Productivity gains drove the early stages 
of the recovery, which did little to increase 
employment and reduce unemployment. 
Productivity gains have slowed recently, 
and have even turned negative, so it could 
be that the rest of the expansion may be 
driven by increases in hours and hiring. If 
so, the relative strength of the employment 
recovery is determined by two factors: the 
number of new job openings created and 
how quickly the unemployed can move 
into these new positions. During the fi rst 
16 months of the recovery, job openings 
increased 39 percent, which is nearly 
double the increase in job openings during 
the previous expansion after the 2001 
recession. Job openings increased from 
2.3 million per month to 3.3 million per 
month. However, hiring has remained fl at, 
increasing by only 3.6 percent. (See Figure 
1.)
How can job openings be increasing so 
much faster than new hires? Obviously, 
new openings are going unfi lled, but 
why? First, workers may not qualify for 
the new positions because their skills 
don’t match the job requirements. This 
is referred to as an increase in structural 
unemployment. Workers displaced from a 
declining industry may have to search in 
another industry that has job opportunities 
yet their skills may not easily transfer 
to that industry. This view is somewhat 
controversial, however, with several 
studies pointing to less structural and 
more cyclical change. The restructuring 
and downsizing of the auto industry 
and the real estate slump and its effect 
on construction are two examples of 
regionally concentrated restructuring. 
Typically, workers would respond to these 
conditions by moving to areas with better 
job prospects, but decline in housing 
values, leading to negative home equity 
and foreclosures for many households, 
reduces their ability to do so. An additional 
factor is the increasing duration of 
unemployment, with studies showing that 
the longer duration of unemployment the 
harder it is to get a job. 
Several organizations offer various 
scenarios for the recovery of the labor 
market. For instance, the Congressional 
Budget Offi ce expects the unemployment 
rate to decline to 7.96 percent in 2012 
and the participation rate to increase to 
64.8 percent. This requires an average job 
growth of 227,000 per month over the 
next two years—about twice the current 
rate and slightly under the 2006 average 
rate 268,000 per month. Using the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s recent 
forecast of employment growth in 2011 
of 170,000 jobs per month and extending 
that rate forward paints a bleaker picture. 
The Upjohn Institute calculates that at that 
pace the unemployment rate would not 
come down to 8 percent until the end of 
2015. In order to return to the prerecession 
average unemployment rate of 4.8 percent 
by 2014, the economy would have to 
generate 338,000 jobs each month. It’s 
not impossible, but monthly growth rates 
of this magnitude have occurred only in 
short spurts, and these estimates require 
sustained growth rates at this level.  
Some economists believe that returning 
to the days of unemployment rates below 
5 percent may not be in our future, at least 
not in the short run. They believe that the 
recession has caused the long-run natural 
unemployment rate to be higher than in the 
past, for the reasons just discussed. 
The recession has left the United States 
with a weak employment situation. Job 
openings are picking up, but hires are 
fl at, and the labor market is less dynamic 
than before, with fewer job openings and 
separations—a measure of labor market 
churning and fl exibility. If job openings 
continue to increase and the structural 
changes are minimal, then the rest of 2011 
may see a more substantial rebound in 
employment than many expected a few 
months ago, when the unemployment was 
hovering above 10 percent. Yet, it may take 
at least several more years beyond 2011 
before the labor market situation resembles 
what it was before the recession. 
Randall W. Eberts is president of the Upjohn 
Institute.
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New and Recent Books
Investing in Kids
Early Childhood Programs and 
Local Economic Development
Timothy J. Bartik
 “State and local economic 
development offi cials need new 
strategies, ones backed by fact and 
evidence. Tim Bartik provides exactly 








in your children 
in ways never 
done before. 
Now business leaders and development 
offi cials have a sober, fact-based 
framework for increasing personal 
incomes, local and state workforce 
competitiveness, and national fi scal 
strength. This is a framework for getting 
our country back on its feet and keeping 
it there.”
–Robert Dugger, founder and managing 
partner of Hanover Investment Group; 
chairman of the advisory board, 
Partnership for America’s Economic 
Success
 “Tim Bartik has written a 
thoughtful book on the value of a local 
approach to fi nancing and creating 
early interventions to foster child 
development. The economic case for 
supplementing the early environments 
of disadvantaged children is compelling. 
Annual rates of return of 7–10 percent 
per annum have been estimated—higher 
than return on stocks over the period 
1945–2008 . . . In an era of stringent 
federal budgets, Bartik offers a plan 
for raising the support needed to put 
effective programs into place.”
–James Heckman, Nobel Prize–winning 
economist, University of Chicago
417 pp. $45 cloth 978-0-88099-373-9
$20 paper 978-0-88099-372-2. 2011.
What Works in 
Work-First Welfare
Designing and Managing 
Employment Programs
 in New York City
Andrew R. Feldman
 “The most important contributions 
of this book . . . are its insights into 












beyond the narrow confi nes of 
the welfare system. Even after the 
economy recovers . . . many will 
remain unemployed and out of the 
labor force, in need of whatever help 
the employment services system can 
provide . . . The fi ndings and insights 
in this book should be taken seriously 
by both designers and managers of 
employment programs, whether or 
not they are in New York City or are 
connected to a welfare system . . . It 
is crucial that we continue to learn 
from ongoing comparative evaluations 
as well as from studies of specifi c 
strategies and approaches. This book, 
I believe, is a fi ne example of the kind 
of learning that we need to be engaged 
in.”
–Mary Jo Bane, Harvard University
183 pp. $40 cloth 978-0-88099-376-0
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across the globe. 
Still, the lessons 
on intended and 
unintended effects 




several decades of research and practice 
do not appear to be refl ected in the 
current design and implementation of 
these systems in the public sector.
 This conundrum serves as motivation 
for the contributors to this new volume. 
Led by Nobel laureate James J. 
Heckman, they use U.S. employment 
and training programs as their laboratory 
for investigation into the performance 
of performance standards. Drawing on 
a variety of superior data sources, they 
explore how performance standards 
and incentives infl uence the behavior of 
public managers and agency employees, 
their approaches to service delivery, and 
ultimately, the outcomes for participants.
 As demand for greater accountability 
and a results-oriented government 
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